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NOTES
INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT IN THE
COMPETITIVE MARKETPLACE
[I]n a competitive society it should be assumed that competition is a good
thing, and that a person need not be placed in the position of defending his
status as a competitor when he engages in ... normal competitive acts.1
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, interference with contract 2 has evolved into a
potent form of tort liability.3 For instance, in 1984, Texaco, Inc. was
stunned when it lost a "billion-dollar battle" with Pennzoil; it was a
battle which mushroomed from Pennzoil's interference with contract
action against Texaco. 4 Texaco was eventually forced to file Chapter
11.5
The tort of interference with contract originated as a claim against
1. Statement made by Worth Rowley. 1969 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 196.
2. This tort has been referred to in a variety of ways. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hick-
man, 507 N.E.2d 1014, 1019 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)(interference with business rela-
tions); Wilkerson v. Carlo, 101 Mich. App. 629, 632, 300 N.W.2d 658, 659
(1980)(interference with economic relations); see also Owen, Interference with Trade: The
Illegitimate Offspring of an Illegitimate Tort?, 3 MONASH U. L. REV. 41, 65 (1976); Sayre,
Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663, 702 (1923).
Liability for interference with contract is a universal form of recovery, similar to
that of the prima facie tort. For a discussion of the prima facie tort doctrine, see
Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Principle, 54 Nw. U.L. REV.
563 (1959); and Forkosch, An Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause of Action, 42 COR-
NELL L.Q 465 (1957).
The New York and Missouri courts have adopted the claim of prima facie tort as
an action separate from interference with contract. See Shipper v. Avon Prods. Inc.,
605 F. Supp. 701, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Anselmo v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 595
F. Supp. 541, 548 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aft'd, 771 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1985); Lundberg v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 661 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Porter v. Crawford &
Co., 611 S.W.2d 265, 268-72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Murphy v. American Home
Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 304, 448 N.E.2d 86, 90-91, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 237
(1983). However, most jurisdictions have refused to adopt the prima facie tort. See
Perdue v.J.C. Penney Co., 470 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)(applying Texas
law); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 213, 536 P.2d 512, 513 (1975)(separate category of
prima facie tort was found to serve no purpose and was eliminated).
3. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App.), cert.
dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1305 (1987)(the damages in this action for tortious interference
with a contract for a stock purchase-merger were $7.53 billion in compensatory dam-
ages and $1 billion in exemplary damages).
4. Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
5. Wall St.J., Apr. 13, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
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an individual who had physically injured a member of the plaintiff's
household.6 Eventually, the violence requirement was eliminated,
and the tort was expanded into a claim for damages against anyone
who induced the plaintiff's servant to leave his employ.7 Today, the
courts in the United States allow the tort to protect virtually every
type of contract from interference. 8 In some instances, a contract is
not even required.9
The tort of interference with contract protects a broad range of
economic relations. However, the idea that a person should not in-
terfere with another's economic relationships is easier to expound in
the abstract than to apply in the particular.tO
One fundamental question engendered in this confusion needs to
be answered: what interests should be protected? Courts differ sub-
stantially as to the type of interest they consider an adequate basis
for an interference with contract claim. I I
This Note will first trace the development of the tort of interfer-
ence with contract. It will then identify what interests are actually
being protected and question whether those interests deserve pro-
tection. 12 In particular, the courts' protection of unenforceable con-
tracts, contracts terminable at-will, noncontractual economic
relationships, and prospective advantage will be examined.t3 Fi-
nally, the application of the tort of interference with contract in Min-
nesota will be analyzed.14
6. See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766, comment c (1979)("The liability for
inducing breach of contact is now regarded as but one instance, rather than the ex-
clusive limit, of protection against improper interference with business relations.").
9. Id. "The added element of a definite contract may be a basis for greater
protection; but some protection is appropriate against improper interference with
reasonable expectancies of commercial relations, even when an existing contract is
lacking." Id. See, e.g., Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 822, 537 P.2d 865, 868,
122 Cal. Rptr. 745, 748 (1975)("The tort of interference with an advantageous rela-
tionship, or with a contract, does not ... disintegrate because it relates to a contract
not written or an advantageous relation not articulated into a contract.")(emphasis added
and quoting Zimmerman v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 191 Cal. App. 2d
55, 57, 12 Cal. Rptr. 319, 320 (1961).
10. Compare Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183,
406 N.E.2d 445, 428 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1980) (New York Court of Appeals requires an
enforceable contract) with Buckaloo, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 537 P.2d 865, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745
(California Supreme Court protected a broker's interests in an unenforceable com-
mission agreement).
11. See infra notes 57-107 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 57-107 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 59-107 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 108-161 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 15
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INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORT
Although the tort of interference with contract seems to be a mod-
em cause of action, its beginning dates back to early Roman law.'5
In that era, it was not the existence of a contract which was signifi-
cant, rather relationships within a household were being protected
against an outsider's violent conduct.16
Consequently, the head of the household was allowed to bring an
action against anyone who committed violence upon his family or
servants. 17 The head of the household was the only individual enti-
tled to bring such an action.' 8
By the thirteenth century, the cause of action was adopted by the
English common law and applied to the master-servant relation-
ship.19 Hence, a master was allowed to bring a common law action
for the loss of his servant's services due to a third party's violence.
20
From 1349 to 1350 the Black Death killed one third of England's
population, resulting in a dramatic decrease in the labor supply.21
Competition for servants intensified.22 Parliament responded by en-
acting the Statute of Labourers. 23 This ordinance eliminated the vi-
olence requirement for an interference action and allowed a master
to bring an action any time his servant was enticed away from his
employ.24
In the centuries that followed, the application of this rule contin-
ued to be expanded. In 1853, the English court established the in-
ducement of breach of contract as a separate, independent tort in the
15. See Sayre, supra note 2, at 663.
16. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 129 at 979 (5th ed. 1984)[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
17. See Sayre, supra note 2, at 663.
18. Id. The head of household was allowed to bring an action against anyone
who committed violence upon his wife, children, slaves, or other members of his
establishment. He was even permitted to bring an action for any insults made to
them. This law was based on the theory that these individuals were so identified with
the head of household that the wrong was really against him. Id.
19. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 16, at 980.
20. Id.
21. Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society's Interest in Com-
mercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1509 (1981).
22. Id.
23. 23 Ewd. 3 (1349). The Statute of Labourers, 25 Ewd. 3, was enacted to make
enforcement of the ordinance easier. See Sayre, supra note 2, at 665.
24. Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations, 41 HARV. L. REV. 728, 729
(1928). The common law action and the Statute of Labourers action eventually
merged into a single action on the case. Id. at 729; Owen, supra note 2, at 43. See
Blake v. Lanyon, 6 Term. Rep. 221, 101 Eng. Rep. 521 (1795); Hart v. Aldridge, 1
Cowp. 55, 98 Eng. Rep. 964 (1774). This single action on the case allowed recovery
without proof of violence and was without the statutory limitation on remedies. Car-
penter, supra, at 729.
19891
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landmark case of Lumley v. Gye.2 5 In Lumley, an opera singer who was
under contract to sing at the plaintiff's theatre was induced by the
defendant, the plaintiff's competitor, to break her contract and sing
at the defendant's theatre. 26 Although the operatic artiste was con-
sidered an independent contractor and not a servant,2 7 the court
held that the principle of the Statute of Labourers should apply and
that a tort had been committed.28 Twenty-eight years later in Bowen
v. Hall,29 the English court made it clear that Lumley v. Gye had be-
come an accepted part of English law.30
The doctrine of Lumley v. Gye was subsequently extended by
Temperton v. Russell 3 1 to include a contract which did not involve per-
sonal services or violent conduct. The defendants in Temperton, were
liable to the plaintiff for inducing persons, who were under contract
with the plaintiff to supply building materials, to break their con-
tracts.3 2 Interference with contract had become a well established
cause of action in the English courts.
3 3
Initially, United States courts were not disposed to accept this
tort,3 4 applying the doctrine predominantly to master-servant con-
flicts.35 Presently, however, an action for intentional interference
25. 2 El. & BI. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
26. Id. at 217, 118 Eng. Rep. at 750.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 224, 118 Eng. Rep. at 752.
29. 6 Q.B.D. 333 (1881).
30. See Carpenter, supra note 24, at 729. In this case the plaintiff recovered dam-
ages from the defendant for wrongfully inducing an individual, who was under con-
tract with the plaintiff to manufacture and glaze bricks, to discontinue his service. 6
Q.B.D. 333, 334-35 (1881).
31. 1 Q.B. 715 (1893).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., D.C. Thompson & Co. v. Deakin, 1952 Ch. 646 (C.A.)(interference
with contractual relations actionable when third party induces breach); Jasperson v.
Dominion Tobacco Co., 1923 App. Cas. 709 (P.C.); Sports & Gen. Press Agency v.
"Our Dogs" Publishing Co., 2 K.B. 880 (1916) (recognized possibility of interference
with contract, but rejected claim as to exclusive contract to photograph dog show).
34. For instance, at first the New York courts denied any action for interference
with contract unless the contract was for personal services. Ashley v. Dixon, 48 N.Y.
430 (1872). Later recovery was denied on the basis of the defendant's justification
instead of the plaintiff's failure to state a cause of action. National Protective Ass'n of
Steam Fitters & Helpers v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, 331, 63 N.E. 369, 373 (1902).
Subsequently, the rationale of the earlier cases was rejected and recovery was permit-
ted. See, e.g., S.C. Posner Co. v. Jackson, 223 N.Y. 325, 333, 119 N.E. 573, 575
(1918). Finally, intentional interference with contract was declared actionable with-
out reservation. Campbell v. Gates, 236 N.Y. 457, 460, 141 N.E. 914, 915 (1923).
Louisiana continues to hold that interference with contract is not tortious unless
unlawful means are employed. See, e.g., Cust v. Item Co., 200 La. 515, 523, 8 So. 2d
361, 363 (1942); Hartman v. Greene, 193 La. 234, 235-36, 190 So. 390, 391, cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 612 (1939).
35. See, e.g., Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578, 581-82, 33 P. 492, 493 (1893)(over-
[Vol. 15
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with contract exists in all the states,3 6 with the exception of
Louisiana.37
The tort in the United States extends far beyond the old entice-
ment-of-servant action which was the basis of Lumley v. Gye. 38 The
tort of interference with contract now encompasses virtually every
type of contract and economic relationship and the violence require-
ment no longer exists.39
ruled by Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941)); Glencoe
Sand & Gravel Co. v. Hudson Bros. Comm'n Co., 138 Mo. 439, 445-46, 40 S.W. 93,
94-95 (1897)(overruled by Downey v. United Weatherproofing, Inc., 363 Mo. 852,
253 S.W.2d 976 (1953)); Swain v.Johnson, 151 N.C. 93, 93, 65 S.E. 619, 619 (1909);
Sleeper v. Baker, 22 N.D. 386, 394, 134 N.W. 716, 719 (1911).
36. See, e.g., Sparks v. McCrary, 156 Ala. 382, 47 So. 332 (1908); Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Aurora Air Serv. Co., 604 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1979); Antwerp Diamond
Exch. of Am., Inc. v. Better Business Bureau, 130 Ariz. 523, 637 P.2d 733 (1981);
Chanay v. Chittenden, 115 Ariz. 32, 563 P.2d 287 (1977); Meason v. Ralston Purina
Co., 56 Ariz. 291, 107 P.2d 224 (1940); Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 446
S.W.2d 543 (1969); Mahoney v. Roberts, 86 Ark. 130, 110 S.W. 225 (1908); Watson
v. Settlemeyer, 150 Colo. 326, 372 P.2d 453 (1962); Weber v. Nonpareil Baking Co.,
85 Colo. 232, 274 P. 932 (1929); Order of Ry. Conductors v. Jones, 78 Colo. 80, 239
P. 882 (1925); Blake v. Levy, 191 Conn. 257, 464 A.2d 52 (1983); Tamiami Trail
Tours v. Cotton, 463 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1985); Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206, 1 So.
934 (1887); Salter v. Howard, 43 Ga. 601 (1871); Studdard v. Evans, 108 Ga. App.
819, 135 S.E.2d 60 (1964); Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 522
P.2d 1102 (1974); Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 52 N.E. 924 (1898); Parkway
Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Darien, 43 Ill. App. 3d 400, 357 N.E.2d 211 (1976); Biggs
v. Marsh, 446 N.E.2d 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Stoller Fisheries, Inc. v. American
Title Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 336 (Iowa 1977); Dassance v. Nienhuis, 57 Mich. App.
422, 225 N.W.2d 789 (1975)(overruled by G & D Co. v. Durand Milling Co., 67 Mich.
App. 253, 240 N.W.2d 765 (1976)); Mealey v. Bemidji Lumber Co., 118 Minn. 427,
136 N.W. 1090 (1912); Protective Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, 445 So. 2d 215 (Miss.
1983); Downey v. United Weatherproofing, Inc., 363 Mo. 852, 253 S.W.2d 976
(1953); Briner Elec. Co. v. Sachs Elec. Co., 680 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984);
Bolz v. Myers, 200 Mont. 286, 651 P.2d 606 (1982); Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 113
N.J.L. 582, 175 A. 62 (1934).
37. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Graham v. St. Charles Street Railroad, 47
La. Ann. 1656, 18 So. 707 (1895) did award a plaintiff recovery on the basis of inten-
tional interference with contractual relations. In this early case, the defendant dis-
couraged customers from patronizing the plaintiff's grocery store, and the court held
that a man has an action for damages when someone has acted improperly and
caused others to stop buying from him. Id. at 708. However, despite this holding,
Louisiana has refused to recognize this tort. See Eximco, Inc. v. Trane Co., 737 F.2d
505, 511 (5th Cir. 1984); Cust v. Item Co., 200 La. 515, 522-23, 8 So. 2d 361, 363
(1942); Robert Heard Hale, Inc. v. Gaiennie, 102 So. 2d 324, 326 (La. Ct. App.
1958).
38. Note, supra note 21, at 1499-1500.
39. See, e.g.,J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr.
407 (1979)(relation of restaurant to its potential customers); Gold v. Los Angeles
Democratic League, 49 Cal. App. 3d 365, 122 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1975) (interference with
prospective employment relationship between political candidate and electorate);
Bowl-Mor Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 297 A.2d 61 (Del Ch. 1972)(interference with re-
lationship between manufacturer of equipment and potential lessors); Barlow v. In-
1989]
5
Grother: Interference with Contract in the Competitive Marketplace
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Contracts and business relations play an important role in our so-
ciety. Our society and market economy has a considerable interest in
the formal integrity of contracts.40 Contractual relations provide re-
liability and structure to our marketplace. 4' The tort protection,
which interference with contract provides, helps promote this type of
contractual reliability.42 However, if the protection is extended to
cover non-binding contracts, it promotes stability at the expense of
free competition.43
Liability based on interference with contract contradicts the foun-
dation of the competitive economic order in the United States. 44
Competition in the United States presupposes that businesses will
act in pursuit of their own self-interest in order to better serve their
market.45 "[Elffective competition requires both aggressive and de-
fensive actions.' '46 Competition depends upon eliminating those so-
cial institutions which restrict free movement and enhancing those
institutions which increase free movement. 47 The tort of interfer-
ence with contract, however, unreasonably restricts free movement
in the marketplace.
ternational Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 522 P.2d 1102 (1974)(interference with
stockholders' financing agreement); Owen v. Williams, 322 Mass. 356, 77 N.E.2d 318
(1948)(interference with employment relation between nurse and hospital); Guard-
Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Co., 50 N.Y.2d 183, 406 N.E.2d 445, 428
N.Y.S.2d 628 (1980)(interference with contract between distributor and manufac-
turer); Ryan v. Brooklyn Eye & Ear Hosp., 46 A.D.2d 87, 360 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1974)(in-
terference with economic relationship between doctor and hospital); Alder, Barish,
Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (1978)(interference
with contractual relationship between law firm and its clients); Glenn v. Point Park
College, 441 Pa. 474, 272 A.2d 895 (197 1)(interference with prospective contractual
relationship between real estate broker and vendor); Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co.,
729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1305 (1987)(relation be-
tween oil companies); Kvenild v. Taylor, 594 P.2d 972 (Wyo. 1979)(relation between
real estate vendor and purchaser). But see Davis v. Condit, 124 Minn. 365, 14 N.W.
1089 (1914)(no claim for interference in marriage contract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 766B (1979)(contract for marriage is not subject to this tort).
40. See Note, supra note 21, at 1493.
41. Id.
42. Id. The court in Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. Olympian Sales & Management
Consultants, Inc., 690 P.2d 207 (Colo. 1984) stated that, "[t]he existence of the tort
protects the relationship between parties to a contract .. ." Id. at 210.
43. Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183, 406
N.E.2d 445, 428 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1980).
44. For instance, Professor Carl Auerbach in an American Law Institute debate
over Dean Prosser's draft on tortious interference for the Restatement (Second) of
Torts stated that, "[floreign lawyers reading the Restatement as an original matter
would find it astounding that the whole competitive order of American industry is
prima facie illegal. ... 1969 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 201. See also supra note 1 and
accompanying text.
45. J. CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS 9 (1961).
46. Id.
47. C. RATZLAFF, THE THEORY OF FREE COMPETITION 36 (1936).
[Vol. 15
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The application of this tort to both enforceable and unenforceable
contracts and the varying expectations of the parties within these re-
lationships have made it difficult to define the boundaries of this tort
in a coherent manner. 48 The tort of interference with contract there-
fore has been the subject of serious criticism.49
Despite the criticism and the uncertainties in its application, courts
continue to apply the tort and increase the availability of its protec-
tion.50 Generally, the following elements5 1 must be established
before an action for interference with contract will be successful: (1)
the existence of a contract or business relation;52 (2) the defendant's
48. See Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of
Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 61 (1982). "[I]nterference torts are
dangerously undefined." Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34
ARK. L. REV. 335, 347 (1980).
49. See Dobbs, supra note 48.
50. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 16, at 979.
51. The following cases have listed these same elements as necessary to establish
an interference with contract claim: Hare v. Family Pub. Serv., 334 F. Supp. 953,
956-57 (D. Md. 1971); Lowder Realty, Inc. v. Odom, 495 So. 2d 23, 25 (Ala. 1986);
Bendix Corp. v. Adams, 610 P.2d 24, 27 (Alaska 1980); Snow v. Western Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 152 Ariz. 27, 35, 730 P.2d 204, 211 (1986); Walt Bennett Ford, Inc. v. Pulaski
County Special School Dist., 274 Ark. 208, 210, 624 S.W.2d 426, 429 (1981); Solo-
mon v. Aberman, 196 Conn. 359, 363, 493 A.2d 193, 197 (1985); Sloan v. Sax, 505
So. 2d 526, 527-28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); American Medical Int'l, Inc. v. Schel-
ler, 462 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 947 (1985); Mc-
Donald v. McGowan, 402 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Fearick v.
Smugglers Cove, Inc., 379 So. 2d 400, 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Symon v. J.
Rolfe Davis, Inc., 245 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); McEnroe v. Morgan,
106 Idaho 326, 329, 678 P.2d 595, 599 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984); Belden Corp. v. In-
ternorth, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 551, 413 N.E.2d 98, 101 (1980); Monarch Indus-
trial Towel & Uniform Rental, Inc. v. Model Coverall Serv., Inc., 178 Ind. App. 235,
236, 381 N.E.2d 1098, 1099 (1978); Stoller Fisheries, Inc. v. American Title Ins. Co.,
258 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Iowa 1977); Wilkerson v. Carlo, 101 Mich. App. 629, 632, 300
N.W.2d 658, 659 (1980); Honigmann v. Hunter Group, Inc., 733 S.W.2d 799, 808
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987); see also Bolz v. Myers, 200 Mont. 286, 297, 651 P.2d 606, 611
(1982)(in order to establish interference with contract or business relations, one
needs to show the acts were: (1) intentional and willful; (2) calculated to cause dam-
age to the plaintiff or his business; (3) done with unlawful purpose of causing damage
or loss without right or justifiable cause on part of the actor; and (4) actual damage
and loss result).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977) has also defined interfer-
ence with contract:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a
contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by
inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract,
is subject to liability to the other or the pecuniary loss resulting to the other
from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.
Id.
52. The tort of interference with contract only applies in situations where the
contract or relationship is between the plaintiff and a third party, not when the con-
tract is between the plaintiff and the defendant. Laser Indus., Ltd. v. Eder Instru-
ment Co., 573 F. Supp. 987, 994 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Campbell v. Westdahl, 148 Ariz.
19891
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knowledge of the contract or business relationship;53 (3) intentional
interference by the defendant with the contract or business relation-
ship; 54 (4) the absence of justification for the defendant's interfer-
ence; 5 5 and (5) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's
interference.56
432, 715 P.2d 288, 294-95 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Payne v. Pennzoil Corp., 138 Ariz.
52, 672 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Galinski v. Kessler, 134 Ill. App. 3d
602, 607, 480 N.E.2d 1176, 1180 (1985); Klooster v. North Iowa State Bank, 404
N.W.2d 564, 570 (Iowa 1987). See also infra text accompanying notes 57-58.
53. Without knowledge of the plaintiff's contract or interest, or at least of facts
which would lead a reasonable person to believe that a contract or interest exists
there can be no intent and no liability. Augustine v. Trucco, 124 Cal. App. 2d 229,
268 P.2d 780 (1954); Kerr v. DuPree, 35 Ga. App. 122, 132 S.E. 393 (1926);
Snowden v. Sorenson, 246 Minn. 526, 75 N.W.2d 795 (1956); Thomason v. Spark-
man, 55 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Kenworthy v. Kleinberg, 182 Wash. 425,
47 P.2d 825 (1935). It is generally held that if a party knows the facts which give rise
to the plaintiff's contractual rights against another, he has the necessary knowledge
for liability, even if he is mistaken as to the legal significance of the facts and believes
that there is no contract, or that the contract means something else. Piedmont Cot-
ton Mills Inc. v. H.W. Ivey Construction Co., 109 Ga. App. 876, 137 S.E.2d 528
(1964); Calbom v. Knudtzon, 65 Wash. 2d 157, 396 P.2d 148 (1964).
54. Intent has been defined as that purpose or aim or state of mind with which a
person acts or fails to act. Usually it is reasonable to infer that a person intends the
natural and probable consequences of his acts. See Baker v. United States, 310 F.2d
924 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963)(criminal case).
In addition to intent, there must also be interference. In American Medical Int'l
v. Scheller, 462 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) the court stated that an
"[u]nsuccessful interference is simply not the kind of interference upon which a tort
may be founded or upon which damages may be assessed." Id. at 9.
A claim for negligent interference with contract is usually not available. See Mat-
tingly v. Sheldon Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356 (Alaska 1987); ABA SECTION OF LITI-
GATION, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR BUSINESS TORT LITIGATION 8
(1980)(hereinafter ABA JURY INSTRUCTIONS); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 766(c), comment a (1979); but see Carbone v. Ursich, 209 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1953);
Ames v. Union R. Co., 117 Mass. 541 (1895).
55. Some courts have held that justification is an element to be plead and proven
by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Bahlada v. Hankinson Corp., 228 Pa. Super. 153, 323 A.2d
121 (1974); see also A.F. Arnold & Co. v. Pacific Professional Ins., Inc., 27 Cal. App.
3d 710, 104 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1972)(court suggested that the reason some courts have
treated the lack of justification as an element of the tort, rather than as a defense,
derived from the practice of using the word unjustified in describing the tort). How-
ever, the majority of courts have held that justification is an affirmative defense to be
plead and proven by the defendant. See, e.g., Hope Basket Co. v. Product Advance-
ment Corp., 187 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 833 (1951); Polytec, Inc. v.
Utah Foam Prods., Inc., 439 So. 2d 683 (Ala. 1983).
56. The defendant must be shown to have caused the interference and the loss.
Lingard v. Kiraly, 110 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Wahl v. Strous, 344 Pa.
402, 25 A.2d 820 (1942).
Punitive damages may be awarded in certain circumstances. Chanay v. Chit-
tenden, 115 Ariz. 32, 563 P.2d 287 (1977).
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II. THE INTERESTS PROTECTED
A beginning point in analyzing a tortious interference claim is to
determine whether there is an interest which should be protected.
Although most contracts and business relationships are sufficient
to form the basis of a tortious interference action, courts have not
clearly fashioned a reliable standard for making such a
determination.
If an express, enforceable contract exists between the plaintiff and
a third party, the sufficiency of the interest will usually not be at is-
sue. However, if the contract is unenforceable or terminable at-will,
inconsistent results may occur among the jurisdictions.57 Also, if the
plaintiff attempts to base her claim upon a noncontractual or pro-
spective advantage, the existence of a protectable interest may once
again be at issue.58 The following sections will examine these types
of interests and their place within the tort of interference with
contract.
A. Unenforceable Contracts
The law does not object to the voluntary performance of an agree-
ment which is legally unenforceable.5 9 The courts even indulge in
the assumption that an unenforceable promise will be carried out if
no one interferes with it.60 Accordingly, courts allow contracts
which are unenforceable by reason of the statute of frauds,61 formal
defects,62 lack of consideration or mutuality,63 or conditions prece-
57. See infra notes 60-97 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
59. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 16, at 995.
60. See, e.g., Daughterty v. Kessler, 264 Md. 281, 286 A.2d 95 (1972)(the court
explained that an oral agreement violative of the statue of frauds was not void, but
was merely unenforceable, and that while such a contract may be unenforceable as
between the parties, it may still in various aspects have life, force, and effect as be-
tween the parties to the agreement and third parties).
61. Accord Jackson v. Standfield, 137 Ind. 592, 36 N.E. 345 (1894); Powell v.
Leon, 172 Kan. 267, 239 P.2d 974 (1952); Vaught v. Jonathon L. Pettyjohn & Co.,
104 Kan. 174, 178 P. 623 (1919); Daugherty v. Kessler, 264 Md. 281, 286 A.2d 95
(1972); Coronet Development Co. v. F.S.W., Inc., 379 Mich. 302, 150 N.W.2d 809
(1967); Northern Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Henderson Bros., Inc., 83 Mich. App.
84, 268 N.W.2d 296 (1978); Royal Realty Co. v. Levin, 244 Minn. 288, 69 N.W.2d
667 (1955); Geo. H. Beckmann, Inc. v. Charles H. Reid & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. Super.
159, 130 A.2d 48 (1957); Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 84 N.E.2d 176 (1954);
F.D. Hill & Co. v. Wallerich, 67 Wash. 2d 409,407 P.2d 956 (1965); Bitzke v. Folger,
231 Wis. 513, 286 N.W. 36 (1939). Contra Dolton v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
642 P.2d 21 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
62. See, e.g., Salter v. Howard 43 Ga. 601, 603 (1871); Studdard v. Evans, 135
S.E.2d 60, 64 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964).
63. See, e.g., Harry A. Finman & Son, Inc. v. Connecticut Truck & Trailer Serv.
Co., 169 Conn. 407, 363 A.2d 86 (1975)(lack of mutuality); Allen v. Leybourne, 190
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dent to the existence of the obligation64 to be the basis for an action
for interference with contract.
California is a good example of a jurisdiction which has read the
contract element very broadly.65 California courts apply the tort of
interference with contract to protect all contracts and not just those
that have "attained the dignity of a legally enforceable agreement." 66
For instance, in Zimmerman v. Bank of America National Trust & Sav-
ings Association,67 a real estate broker brought an action against a
bank alleging that the bank had interfered with an oral contract be-
tween himself and realty owners. 68 The realty owners and the bro-
ker orally agreed that the owners would pay the broker a commission
if he obtained and procured a purchaser for their real estate. 69
Later, bank employees offered to save the realty owners money by
avoiding the broker's commission. 70 The bank employees then set
up a meeting between the realty owners and the purchasers, who
were unacquainted with each other.7 1 Thus, the realty owners
breached their oral contract with the broker and deprived the broker
So. 2d 825 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)(lack of consideration); Barlow v. International
Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 522 P.2d 1102 (1974)(lack of certainty); Aalfo Co. v.
Kinney, 105 NJ. 345, 144 A. 715 (1929)(lack of mutuality and certainty); but see
Grimm v. Baumgart, 121 Ind. App. 634, 97 N.E.2d 871 (1951); Malevich v. Hakola,
278 N.W.2d 541 (Minn. 1979)(if essential terms are missing and parties didn't intend
to be bound then no interference with contract).
64. For instance, the attorney's contract with his client for a contingent fee. Em-
ployers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Freeman, 229 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1955); State
Farm Fire Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 184 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1950); Herron v. State Farm
Mutual Ins. Co., 56 Cal. 2d 202, 14 Cal. Rptr. 294, 363 P.2d 310 (1961); Richette v.
Solomon, 410 Pa. 6, 187 A.2d 910 (1963); Keels v. Powell, 207 S.C. 97, 34 S.E.2d
482 (1945).
65. In the last forty years, California courts have expanded the protection af-
forded by the tort of interference with contract. Initially, the protection was only for
existing contracts. Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941).
Then, protection was extended to all existing or future advantageous relationships.
Buckaloo v.Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 537 P.2d 865, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1975). Now,
protection extends to all areas of foreseeable harm. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.
3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).
66. Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 827, 537 P.2d 865, 872, 122 Cal. Rptr
745, 752 (1975).
California courts explicitly distinguish the availability of the tort from the en-
forceability of the plaintiff's contractual interest. The application of interference
with contract is based upon more flexible assessments of the interests protected by
the tort. California courts focus their analysis of the tort on the sufficiency of the
interests of a particular plaintiff.
67. 191 Cal. App. 2d 55, 12 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1961).
68. Id. at 57, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. d.
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of his rightful commission.72
Consequently, the broker sought recovery from the bank on the
grounds that the bank interfered with the oral contract.7 3 The trial
court sustained the bank's demurrer to the complaint on the grounds
that the statute of frauds rendered the contract unenforceable.74
However, on appeal the California District Court of Appeals held
that the bank could not invoke a statute of frauds defense and re-
versed the trial court.75 In reaching this conclusion, the court stated:
The nature of the tort does not vary with the legal strength, or
enforceability, of the relation disrupted. The actionable wrong lies
in the inducement to break the contract or to sever the relation-
ship, not in the kind of contract or relationship so disrupted,
whether it is written or oral, enforceable or not enforceable. 76
On the other hand, some jurisdictions hold that in order for a con-
tract to be the basis of an interference with contract claim, it must be
valid and enforceable.77 The New York courts enforce a rigid re-
quirement that an enforceable contract must underlie all intentional
interference with contract claims.78 These courts reason that unen-
forceable contracts should be allowed only very limited tort
protection.79
72. Id.
73. Id. The broker likewise brought causes of action against the realty owners
and purchasers for conspiring with the bank to interfere with the commission con-
tract. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 62, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
76. Id. at 61, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21. The court also stated:
[W]e see no good reason why the protection against the dangers of oral
agreements, which the statute affords to parties to a transaction, should in-
ure to a stranger who seeks the destruction of the transaction and whose
status fundamentally differs from that of the party whom the statute seeks to
protect.
Id. at 62, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
77. See, e.g., Zeyher v. S.S. & S. Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 606 (7th Cir. 1963)(not liable
for interference with contract which was unenforceable for lack of mutuality and cer-
tainty); Watts v. Warner, 151 Tenn. 421, 269 S.W. 913 (1925)(no judgment may be
based against a defendant for interference with an unenforceable repudiated
contract).
78. Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183, 406
N.E.2d 445, 428 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1980).
79. 50 N.Y.2d at 193, 406 N.E.2d at 449-50, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 633-34. Although
this rule is typically followed in New York, some exceptions do exist. New York deci-
sions allowing a tort action despite the lack of a possible breach of contract action
have fallen into two categories. First, there is a line of cases, which begin with Rice v.
Manley, 66 N.Y. 82 (1876), in which the act of the interferer was deemed to be inde-
pendently tortious.
Second, there is a line of lower court decisions that separate consideration of the
availability of the tort from assessment of the enforceability of the breached contract.
In Hardy v. Erickson, 36 N.Y.S.2d 823 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942), the New York Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's demurrer to a tort action based on the employment
1989]
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The decision by the New York Court of Appeals, in Guard-Life Corp.
v. S. Parker Hardware Corp.,80 has sharpened that state's focus on al-
lowing tort protection only for enforceable legal rights. Guard-Life
involved an interference claim based on a contract that was unen-
forceable for lack of mutuality.8 1 The plaintiff, a distributor, had en-
tered into a five-year exclusive distribution contract with a Japanese
manufacturer.8 2 The defendant, a competing distributor, allegedly
caused the manufacturer to breach the contract with the plaintiff and
deal with the defendant instead.
8 3
The lower court denied the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment and the appellate court reversed,8 4 reasoning that since the
contract was unenforceable and no improper conduct was present,
the contract was an insufficient basis for an interference claim.85
Contrary to the holding in Zimmerman, the Guard-Life court stated
that a party who seeks to impose liability for an unenforceable or
terminable at-will contract,
enjoys no legally enforceable right to performance; his interest is a
mere expectancy-a hope of future contractual relations. Conse-
quently, there having been no trespass or invasion of a substantial
legal interest, there is no liability for interference with performance
of a competitor's voidable contract absent employment of wrongful
means, unlawful restraint of trade, or lack of competitive motive.
86
In a competitive society such as the United States, the Guard-Life
rule is more appropriate than the rule found in Zimmerman. Zimmer-
man allows a party to recover the benefits of a contract to which he is
not otherwise entitled.8 7 The Guard-Life rule, on the other hand, al-
lows a party to recover the benefits of an unenforceable agreement
only when a third party employs wrongful or unlawful practices.SS
Thus, the Guard-Life court preserves the concept of fair competition
while refusing to grant a party a benefit to which he is not entitled.
contract of a hospital manager. The contract was complete with the exception of
additional compensation, the amount of which was apparently not in dispute. Declin-
ing to comment on the enforceability of this contract, the court stated that the plain-
tiff's "reasonable expectancy of a contract," not its enforceability, gave the plaintiff
"a property right which may not be invaded maliciously or unjustifiably." Id. at 826.
80. 50 N.Y.2d 183, 406 N.E.2d 445, 428 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1980).
81. Id. at 195-96, 406 N.E.2d at 451-52, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 635. The court
adopted a Japanese arbitration holding, which found the contract unenforceable, as
res judicata. Id.
82. Id. at 187, 406 N.E.2d at 446, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
83. Id. at 188, 406 N.E.2d at 447, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
84. Id. at 188, 406 N.E.2d at 447, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
85. Id. at 189, 406 N.E.2d at 446, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
86. Id. at 193-94, 406 N.E.2d at 450, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
87. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. The Guard-Life court defined
wrongful means as actions which involve physical violence, fraud, or misrepresenta-
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B. Terminable At- Will Contracts
The overwhelming majority of courts hold that interference with a
contract terminable at-will is actionable.89 These courts reason that
since an at-will contract "is a subsisting relation, of value to the
plaintiff, and presumably to continue in effect" until termination or
interference, it should be protected.90 The Arizona Supreme Court
in Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital,9 1 in particular, reasoned
that "[t]he fact that the employment is at the will of the parties, re-
spectively, does not make it at the will of others."92
This protection of at-will contracts, however, conflicts with the at-
will doctrine. In the employment context, an employment at-will
contract does not guarantee an employee a specific term of employ-
ment.93 As such, either party to the at-will contract may terminate
the relationship at any time for any reason, leaving the remaining
party with no cause of action.94 However, if a third party "inter-
feres" with the same at-will employment relationship, by convincing
the employee at-will to terminate her existing employment in order
to work for him, he may be liable to the employer for ending the at-
will relationship. Thus, although the employer did not bargain with
tion, not persuasion alone. 50 N.Y.2d at 191, 406 N.E.2d at 449, 428 N.Y.S.2d at
632. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 (1977).
Originally, the tort of interference with contract also required violent conduct.
See supra notes 16-18.
89. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Aurora Air Serv. Inc., 604 P.2d 1090,
1093 (Alaska 1979)(Alaska Supreme Court adopts the view held by Prosser-con-
tracts terminable at-will can be the basis of an intentional interference claim);
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 399, 710 P.2d 1025,
1041-42 (1985); Heavener, Ogier Serv., Inc. v. R.W. Florida Region Inc., 418 So. 2d
1074, 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Studdard v. Evans, 108 Ga. App. 819, 135
S.E.2d 60, 64 (1964); Powers v. Delnor Hosp., 135 Ill. App. 3d 317, 320, 481 N.E.2d
968, 970 (1985); Kemper v. Worcester, 106 Ill. App. 3d 121, 125, 435 N.E.2d 827,
830 (1982); Toney v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 220, 222 (Iowa 1985);
Tash v. Houston, 74 Mich. App. 566, 568, 254 N.W.2d 579, 580 (1977); Childress v.
Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 674, 84 S.E.2d 176, 184 (1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 766, comment g (1977).
90. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 16, at 995-96. Until an at-will contract is ter-
minated, it is "valid and subsisting, and the defendant may not improperly interfere
with it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766, comment g (1977).
91. 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985).
92. Id. at 397, 710 P.2d at 1041 (quoting Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 38 (1915)).
93. Typically, an at-will employment relationship is for an indefinite length of
time. See, e.g., Cedarstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 532, 117 N.W.2d 213,
221 (1962). See also Murg & Scharman, Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm
the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REV. 329, 335 (1982)(broad presumption that an employee could
be discharged at any time with or without cause).
94. Under the at-will doctrine, absent statutory or judicial exceptions, employ-
ment "may be terminated by either party at any time, and no action can be sustained
for wrongful discharge." Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 302, 266
N.W.2d 872, 877 (1936).
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the employee nor offer the employee a stable, definite relationship,
he is still allowed to recover damages from a third party for the loss
of his employee if the third party helps bring about the termination.
By allowing the employer to recover as such, he gains a more definite
relationship than he bargained for. The third party bears the ex-
pense rather than the parties to the at will contract.
Although at-will contracts usually are protected from interference,
some courts fortunately have found that this protection should not
be absolute.95 The possibility of termination is often taken into ac-
count when determining the defendant's privilege to interfere.96
Consequently, an at-will contract is typically not protected when the
defendant's interference is based on any legitimate business purpose
and no improper means are exerted. 97
C. Noncontractual Relationships
An action may lie for intentional interference with a business rela-
tionship even though no contract exists.9 8 In such cases, however,
some courts have found it critical that the plaintiff show that the de-
fendant acted illegally in achieving his end.99
Yet, extending the ambit of the tort of interference with contract
to encompass mere business or economic relationships, courts have
placed an increased burden upon competition. In order to avoid lia-
bility, competitors must now proceed with extreme caution when
they are seeking new business in order to avoid interference.
Many courts attempt to eliminate this strain on competition
through the justification element. However, this approach does not
offer much help to a third party in avoiding an interference with con-
tract lawsuit. First, justification cannot be precisely defined;oo
therefore, it is virtually impossible to determine beforehand whether
an interference is justified.
95. See generally Annotation, Liability for Interference with At- Will Business Relation-
ships, 5 A.L.R.4th 9, 17 (1981).
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766, comment g (1977).
97. See Triangle Film Corp. v. Artcraft Pictures Corp., 250 F. 981, 982-83 (2d
Cir. 1918); TAD, Inc. v. Siebert, 63 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1006-07, 380 N.E.2d 963, 967
(1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768, comment i (1977).
Additionally, it has long been recognized that an officer or director of a corpora-
tion is not liable for inducing the corporation's breach of its own contract if the em-
ployee acts within the scope of his official duties. H.F. Philipsborn & Co. v. Suson, 59
Ill. 2d 465, 474, 322 N.E.2d 45, 50 (1974).
98. Johnson v. Hickman, 507 N.E.2d 1014, 1019 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Fearick v.
Smugglers Cove, Inc., 379 So. 2d 400, 403 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1980); Smith v. Ocean
State Bank, 335 So. 2d 641,644 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Franklin v. Brown, 159 So.
2d 893, 895 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Wilkerson v. Carlo, 101 Mich. App. 629, 632,
300 N.W.2d 658, 659 (1980).
99. Biggs v. Marsh, 446 N.E.2d 977, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
100. Guerdon Indus., Inc. v. Rose, 399 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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Second, although the absence of justification is one of the ele-
ments necessary to establish an interference claim, most courts hold
that the burden of proof with respect to justification is upon the de-
fendant.' 0 ' Justification has thus emerged as the most common de-
fense to an allegation of interference with a business relationship. 102
As a result, the plaintiff's burden of proof is diminished, as well as
free competition in the marketplace.
D. Prospective Advantages
Liability may also be contingent upon interference with an individ-
ual's prospective advantage, relationships which have yet to material-
ize and are merely foreseeable at the time of interference.10 3 Tort
liability for interference with prospective advantage developed from
early cases which involved a third party's use of physical violence or
threats to upset a competitor's future relationships.t104 Generally, to
show that a prospective interest is sufficient to enjoy protection from
interference, a plaintiff need only demonstrate "the probability of
future economic benefit."105
Under the Second Restatement of Torts,106 the typical interfer-
ence with contract analysis is discarded for prospective advantage
cases in favor of a rule which places a greater burden of proof on the
plaintiff. Rather than requiring the defendant to establish justifica-
tion, this rule requires the plaintiff to persuade the trier of fact that
the defendant's interference was improper.0 7 Without such a bur-
den on the plaintiff, this tort would render competition per se illegal.
III. THE TORT IN MINNESOTA
The courts in Minnesota have long recognized the tort of interfer-
ence with contract.10 8 InJoyce v. Great Northern Railway Co., l09 the
101. See, e.g., Royal Realty Co. v. Levin, 244 Minn. 288, 69 N.W.2d 667 (1955); see
supra note 54; see also Hope Basket Co. v. Product Advancement Corp., 187 F.2d 1008
(6th Cir. 1951); Middlesex Concrete Prods. & Excavating Corp. v. Carteret Indus.
Ass'n, 37 NJ. 507, 181 A.2d 774 (1962).
102. See ABA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 54, at 24.
103. See, e.g., Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 827, 537 P.2d 865, 872, 122
Cal. Rptr. 745, 752 (1975).
104. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 16, at 1005.
105. Buckaloo, 14 Cal. 3d at 815, 537 P.2d at 866, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 745.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1977).
107. For instance, in Swager v. Couri, 77 I11. 2d 173, 395 N.E.2d 921 (1979) the
plaintiff's complaint gave sufficient notice of the lack of justification element; there-
fore, the court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. See also Lake Gateway Mo-
tor Inn v. Matt's Sunshine Gift Shops, Inc., 361 So. 2d 769, 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (inter alia tortious interference requires intentional and unjustified interference
by defendant).
108. Mealey v. Bemidji Lumber Co., 118 Minn. 427, 136 N.W. 1090 (1912); see also
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Minnesota Supreme Court first noted that a stranger's wrongful and
malicious interference with the contractual relations of another,
which causes a breach, is an actionable tort."t0 However, it was not
until Mealey v. Bemidji Lumber Co. " 'that this tort was actually applied.
In Mealey, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
finding that the defendant had interfered with the plaintiff's per-
formance in a logging contract." 2 The Mealey court held "that
wrongful interference by a third party with an existing contract be-
tween two others, causing one to breach it and a resulting loss to the
other, is actionable.",3
As in other jurisdictions, the tort of interference with contract in
Minnesota has not escaped the courts' inclination to broaden its ap-
plication.114 In Minnesota, the elements necessary to establish a
claim for interference with contract are essentially the same as other
Guerdon Indus., Inc. v. Rose, 399 N.W.2d 186 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)(interference
with sale of land); Potthoff v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 363 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985)(interference with employment prospects); Furlev Sales & Assocs., Inc. v. North
Am. Automotive Warehouse, 325 N.W.2d 20 (Minn.1982)(wrongful interference
with employment contract); Bacon v. St. Paul Union Stockyards, 161 Minn. 522, 201
N.W. 326 (1924)(wrongful interference with employment); Canellos v. Zotalis, 145
Minn. 292, 177 N.W. 133 (1920)(wrongful interference with sale of business).
109. 100 Minn. 225, 110 N.W. 975 (1907).
110. Id. at 229, 110 N.W. at 976. In this case, the plaintiff was initially employed
by the Union Depot Company. Id. at 226, 110 N.W. at 976. During his employment
the plaintiff was injured and had to severe this relationship. Id. at 227, 110 N.W. at
976. There was a possibility that the defendant railway company had been at fault for
the plaintiff's injury.
Upon his recovery, the plaintiff applied for re-employment with the depot com-
pany and was promised a position subject to the approval of the superintendent. Id.
However, the plaintiff was subsequently prevented from obtaining re-employment
with the depot company because of the actions of the defendant. Id. at 228, 110
N.W. at 977.
The defendant railway company wrote to the depot company requiring them to
obtain a release from the plaintiff. Id. If the plaintiff has agreed to sign this release
the plaintiff would have relinquished any action against the defendant for the injuries
he had sustained during his initial employment with the depot company. Id. The
plaintiff refused to release the defendant, and the depot company did not re-employ
him. Id.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for interference. Id. at 229, 110
N.W. at 976. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the tort of inter-
ference with contract, but relied upon a Minnesota Statute to overrule the lower
court's dismissal. The statute made it unlawful for two employers to join in interfer-
ing with a person's effort to obtain employment. Id. at 235, 110 N.W. at 979.
111. 118 Minn. 427, 136 N.W. 1090 (1912).
112. Id. at 432, 136 N.W. at 1092.
113. Id. at 429, 136 N.W. at 1091.
114. For a discussion of the tort in other jurisdictions see supra notes 34-39 and
accompanying text.
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jurisdictions. 115
Since Mealey, the application of this tort in Minnesota has been
expanded. Minnesota courts have used the tort of interference with
contract to protect not only unenforceable contracts but also non-
contractual relations.1l 6 The Minnesota Supreme Court lists "the
existence of a contract" as the first element necessary in establishing
a claim for interference with contract." 7 Yet the courts do not al-
ways require an existing contract."t 8
Nonetheless, the contract element in an action for interference
with contract in Minnesota is important. 119 For instance, in Malevich
v. Hakola,120 the parties to the sale of real estate had left essential
terms of a written agreement to future negotiation. 12' There was no
subsequent meeting of the minds. 122 It was undisputed that the ven-
dors intended to remain unbound. 123 The court held that the pur-
chasers failed to state a cause of action for tortious interference since
the existence of a contract to convey land is an essential ingredient
115. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the elements
for a interference with contract claim.
Specifically, in Minnesota, recovery can be obtained for interfering with a con-
tract by establishing that: (1) a contract existed; (2) the alleged tortfeasor knew of the
contract; (3) the alleged tortfeasor intentionally interfered with the contract or inten-
tionally procured its breach; (4) the alleged tortfeasor's actions were not justified;
and (5) damage resulted. The elements for interference with contract can be found
in the following cases: Span-Deck, Inc. v. Fab-Con, Inc., 677 F.2d 1237, 1245 (8th
Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 981 (1982); American Surety Co. v. Schottenbauer, 257
F.2d 6, 10 (8th Cir. 1958); Continental Research, Inc. v. Crittenden, Podesta &
Miller, 222 F. Supp. 190, 198 (D. Minn. 1963); Furlev Sales & Assocs., Inc. v. North
Am. Automotive Warehouse, Inc., 325 N.W.2d 20, 25 (Minn. 1982); Bouten v. Rich-
ard Miller Homes, Inc., 321 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 1982); Stephenson v. Plastics
Corp. of Am. Inc., 276 Minn. 400, 416, 150 N.W.2d 668, 679 (1967); Snowden v.
Sorensen, 246 Minn. 526, 532, 75 N.W.2d 795, 799 (1956); Royal Realty Co. v.
Levin, 244 Minn. 288, 292, 69 N.W.2d 667, 671 (1955); Guerdon Indus., Inc. v.
Rose, 399 N.W.2d 186, 187 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Andersen v. Andersen, 376
N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); New Concept Confinement Technology
Feeders, Inc. v. Kuecker, 364 N.W.2d 450, 452-53 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Potthoffv.
Jefferson Lines, Inc., 363 N.W.2d 771, 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). See also MINN.
JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, CIVIL 3D JIG 680 at 156 (West Supp. 1988).
116. See, e.g., Royal Realty Co. v. Levin, 244 Minn. 288, 69 N.W.2d 667
(1955)(Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the prevailing view that noncompliance
with the statute of frauds does not relieve an interfering party of liability); Miller v.
Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949)(child was entitled to recover against
the defendant for enticing the child's mother from his home).
117. See supra note 115.
118. See infra notes 128-138 and accompanying text.
119. Malevich v. Hakola, 278 N.W.2d 541, 544 (Minn. 1979); see also Snowden v.
Sorensen, 246 Minn. 526, 532, 75 N.W.2d 795, 799 (1956).
120. 278 N.W.2d 541 (1979).
121. Id. at 544.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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which was missing. 124
In the same vein, in Bouten v. Richard Miller Homes, Inc. ,125 the con-
tract was void since the contracting parties had failed to meet the
contingencies which were set out in the purchase agreement.'
2 6
Once again, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that there were no
interference with contract rights because there was no contract.
1 2 7
Even if a contract is void because it fails to meet the requirements
of the statute of frauds, however, an interfering party may still be
liable for inducing the breach of the contract.128 In Royal Realty Co.
v. Levin,129 the Minnesota Supreme Court unequivocally held that
the statute of frauds does not relieve the interfering party of liabil-
ity.1So The court reasoned that, "the statute of frauds does not
render a contract absolutely void in the sense that no contract ever
[came] into existence."13i Moreover, the court concluded that the
defense of the statute of frauds could only be employed by those in
privity to the contract.' 3
2
The Minnesota Supreme Court expressly rejected the New York
courts' rule that an interference claim cannot be based on an unen-
124. Id.
125. 321 N.W.2d 895 (Minn. 1982).
126. Id. at 900. The purchase agreement offer expressly provided it would be void
if mortgage financing was not obtained and expressly provided the seller had to ac-
cept the offer in writing. Neither event occurred. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Royal Realty Co. v. Levin, 244 Minn. 288, 292, 69 N.W.2d 667, 671
(1955) (noncompliance with the statute of frauds does not relieve the interfering
party of liability for inducing breach of contract); see also Bouten v. Richard Miller
Homes Inc., 321 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 1982)(interfering party may be liable for
breach of contract); Malevich v. Hakola, 278 N.W.2d 541, 544 (Minn. 1979)(noncom-
pliance with statute of frauds does not relieve interfering party of liability).
Additionally, in Witte Transp. Co. v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 291
Minn. 461, 193 N.W.2d 148 (1971), the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized ac-
tionable claims for interference with noncontractual as well as contractual business
relationships. Id. at 465, 193 N.W.2d at 151. See also Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn.
400, 409, 37 N.W.2d 543, 548 (1949)(in certain situations in which legally enforcea-
ble benefits flow to a party, intentional interference with the relationship may be
actionable); Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 151, 119 N.W. 946, 948 (1909)(if the
defendant's sole purpose in an action is to maliciously injure the plaintiff's business,
then a cause of action accrues); but see Davis v. Condit, 124 Minn. 365, 365-66, 144
N.W. 1089, 1089 (1914)(fiance who breaks a marriage contract has no cause of action
against one responsible for the seduction of his wife-to-be, or for the alienation of
her affections, or for her debauching).
129. 244 Minn. 288, 69 N.W.2d 667 (1955).
130. Id. at 292-93, 69 N.W.2d at 671-72.
131. Id. at 294, 69 N.W.2d at 672 (quoting Borchardt v. Kuliek, 234 Minn. 308,
320, 48 N.W.2d 318, 325 (1951).
132. Id.
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forceable contract.I33 The court stated that the New York courts'
reasoning was "faulty."1
3 4
In addition to unenforceable contracts, Minnesota also offers tort
protection for potential contractual relationships.135 Wrongful in-
terference with a prospective advantage is actionable in Minne-
sota.13 6 Courts often analyze a cause of action for interference with
prospective contractual relations as they would a claim for interfer-
ence with a present contract. In United Wild Rice, Inc. v. Nelson,137 the
court set out the elements of interference with prospective
advantage:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's
prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is sub-
ject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from
loss of the benefits of the relations, whether the interference con-
sists of:
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter
into or continue the prospective relation; or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the
prospective relation. 13 8
Also, a claim for interference with prospective business relations is
subject to a showing by the plaintiff that, absent the conduct of the
interfering party, he would have been able to secure the business
allegedly taken from him. l39
In United Wild Rice, the defendant's former employer alleged that
the defendant was actively soliciting the employer's customers, and
hence, interfering with their contracts. 4 0 In recognizing a need to
133. Id. at 293, 69 N.W.2d at 672. For a discussion of the New York courts' ap-
proach see supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
134. 244 Minn. at 293, 69 N.W.2d at 672.
135. See infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
136. See Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 447, 234 N.W.2d 775, 799 (1975)(research
scientist's action for interference with contract for project funding); Witte Transp.
Co. v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, 291 Minn. 461, 464, 193 N.W.2d 148, 152
(1971) (mere administrative failure will not sustain an action; interference with a non-
contractual business relationship must be willful and malicious); Wicker v. Roering,
364 N.W.2d 479, 481 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)(seller's plowing of land did not consti-
tute interference with contract purchaser's rights under agreement); see also Midway
Manor Convalescent & Nursing Home v. Adcock, 386 N.W.2d 782, 788 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (trial court's denial of a claim for wrongful interference with a prospective
advantage affirmed because the practices of the defendant were justified and pro-
tected by discretionary immunity).
137. 313 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. 1982).
138. Id. at 633 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1977)).
139. North Central Co. v. Phelps Aero, Inc., 272 Minn. 413, 420, 139 N.W.2d 258,
263 (19 6 5)(applying a "but-for" test, the court held that defendant's leasing of an
aircraft to a competing aviation company when not used by lessee, in accordance with
contract, did not violate an implied covenant not to compete).
140. Id. at 631.
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preserve competition, 141 the court denied the plaintiff's claim.142
Although the defendant interfered with the plaintiff's prospective
contractual relations, the court found that the interference was not
improper.143 The court's rationale was based on the Second
Restatement:
(1) One who intentionally causes a third person not to enter into a
prospective contractual relation with another who is his competitor
or not to continue an existing contract terminable at will does not
interfere improperly with the other's relation if:
(a) the relation concerns a matter involved in the competition
between the actor and the other; and
(b) the actor does not employ wrongful means; and
(c) his action does not create or continue an unlawful restraint
of trade; and
(d) his purpose is at least in part to advance his interest in
competing with the other.1
44
Although the Mealey court stated that an interference had to be
"wrongful" in order to be actionable,145 under present law this re-
quirement no longer exists.146 Rather than requiring a "wrongful"
interference, interference is considered actionable when the defend-
ant cannot meet his or her burden of proof and establish that his or
her actions were justified. 147
The justification element in a tortious interference claim is inter-
twined with the alleged tortfeasor's motive. The tortfeasor's motive
can be very important in establishing a claim for interference with
contract.' 4 8 Minnesota recognizes two basic types of unjustified in-
terference. 149 "Interference is unjustifiable when it is done 'for the
indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or of benefiting the defend-
141. Id. at 633. The court stated that "[clompetition is favored in the law. The
law's preference for competition is illustrated by the establishment of a special privi-
lege for competitors." Id.
142. Id. at 635.
143. Id. at 633.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 (1977). The United Wild Rice court
adopted this section. 313 N.W.2d at 633.
145. In Mealey v. Bemidji Lumber Co., 118 Minn. at 429, 136 N.W. at 1091, the
Minnesota Supreme Court stated that a "wrongful" interference by a third party was
actionable.
146. The elements of a claim for interference with contract do not require a
wrongful interference. See supra note 107.
147. See infra notes 148-61.
148. Stephenson v. Plastics Corp. of Am., 276 Minn. 400, 417, 150 N.W.2d 668,
680 (1967); see Royal Realty Co. v. Levin, 244 Minn. 288, 291-92, 69 N.W.2d 667,
671 (1955)("according to the vast majority of decisions, even though the means em-
ployed in procuring the breach are in themselves lawful, where the inducement is
without justification it may nevertheless be actionable").
149. See generally Continental Research, Inc. v. Cruttenden, Podesta & Miller, 222
F. Supp. 190, 200-02 (D. Minn. 1963).
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ant at the expense of the plaintiff'." 150 In Johnson v. Gustafson,151 the
court stated that:
"[m]erely to persuade a person to break his contract, may not be
wrongful in law or fact .... But if the persuasion be used for the
indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or of benefitting the de-
fendant at the expense of the plaintiff, it is a malicious act, which is
in law and in fact a wrong act, and therefore a wrongful act, and
therefore an actionable act if injury ensues from it."152
As stated earlier, justification is the most common affirmative de-
fense to an interference action.153 Justification denotes the presence
of circumstances which establish that a tort was not committed.154
Interference is justified only when it is founded upon a lawful
objective. 155
Ordinarily, justification is a question of fact for the jury and the
burden of proof rests on the defendant. The standard is what is rea-
sonable under the circumstances.15 6 Courts following Minnesota
law have recognized justification as a defense in a variety of
situations. 157
150. See Stephenson, 276 Minn. at 416, 150 N.W.2d at 680 (1967); see also Furlev
Sales & Assocs. Inc. v. North Am. Automotive Warehouse, Inc., 325 N.W.2d 20, 27
(Minn. 1982);Johnson v. Gustafson, 201 Minn. 629, 634, 277 N.W. 252, 255 (1938).
151. 201 Minn. 629, 277 N.W. 252 (1938).
152. Id. at 634, 277 N.W. at 255 (quoting Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Fink, 113 NJ.L.
582, 587, 175 A. 62, 66 (1934))(emphasis omitted).
153. See supra note 102.
154. Johnson v. Radde, 293 Minn. 409, 411, 196 N.W.2d 478, 480 (1972).
155. Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 263, 214 N.W. 754, 755
(1927).
156. Bennett, 270 Minn. at 263, 134 N.W.2d at 900 (1965); see also Furlev, 325
N.W.2d at 27; Bouten, 321 N.W.2d at 901; Royal Realty, 69 N.W.2d at 673; Wolfson v.
Northern States Management Co., 210 Minn. 504, 507, 299 N.W. 676, 678 (1941).
157. See, e.g., Span-Deck, Inc. v. Fab-Con, Inc., 677 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1982)(urg-
ing one to cease making royalty payments because of the invalidity of the underlying
patent was justified); Smith v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 349 F.2d 975 (8th
Cir. 1965)(a right to strike which falls within the protection of national labor right to
strike which falls within the protection of national labor statutes affords a defense of
justification or privilege to a contractual interference action); Langeland v. Farmers
State Bank of Trimont, 319 N.W.2d 26 (Minn. 1982)(a creditor's redemption of a
landowner's farm after the bank failed to do so on the landowner's behalf was justi-
fied since the landowner owed the creditor a debt that it was entitled to collect);
Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 533, 134 N.W.2d 892, 898
(1965)("the right of the defendant to interfere with the plaintiff's attempt to better
his employment may be justified where the interference is made in good faith in an
attempt to assert a legally protected interest which might be endangered or de-
stroyed and under circumstances where the contract gives the employer a right which
is equal or superior to the right of the employee to better his condition"); New Con-
cept Confinement Technology Feeders, Inc. v. Kuecker, 364 N.W.2d 450 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985)(there is a lawful justification to pursue the debt owed by a plaintiff to the
defendant).
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The plaintiff is no longer required to establish that the defendant's
actions were wrongful or unjustified; the plaintiff, however, must es-
tablish that the alleged tortfeasor intended to interfere.158 In Guer-
don Industries, Inc. v. Rose,159 the court stated that, "it appears the
nature of the intent determines liability."1 60 The interference must
be intentional; Minnesota has never recognized an action for negli-
gent interference with a business relation.161 However, by no longer
requiring a plaintiff to affirmatively establish that the defendant
wrongfully interfered but rather by placing the burden on the de-
fendant to show that his or her actions were justified, the Minnesota
courts have reduced the plaintiff's burden at the expense of free
competition.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the tort of interference with contract grew out of timely
and appropriate concerns regarding the protection of the market-
place, this concern is no longer being served. Earlier the tort re-
quired an act of violence; however, today the tort protects most
business relationships, enforceable or unenforceable, from simple
third party interference. By eliminating the violence requirement,
the tort has been broadened beyond its original confines to the point
of creating a strain on free competition. As Texaco, Inc. discovered
when it attempted to outbid Pennzoil and, subsequently lost a bil-
lion-dollar interference with contract lawsuit, free competition is no
longer free.
The time has come to limit the broad reach of this tort. The ele-
ments necessary to prove an interference action should include an
enforceable relationship and a malicious or wrongful interference
with that relationship. These requirements would eliminate the con-
fusion which surrounds the application of the tort and restore free
competition.
Gina M. Grothe
158. Guerdon Indus., Inc. v. Rose, 399 N.W.2d 186 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766, comment a (1977).
159. 399 N.W.2d 186 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
160. Id. at 188.
161. Witte Transp. Co. v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 291 Minn. 461, 466,
193 N.W.2d 148, 151 (1971).
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